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Abstract: We argue that the notion of distal similarity on which Edelman’s
reconstruction of the process of perception and the nature of representa-
tion rests is ill defined. As a consequence, the mapping between world and
description that is supposedly at stake is, in fact, a mapping between two
different descriptions or “representations.”
Edelman has shown experimentally that people can extract the
underlying parameters used to generate a set of novel stimuli.
From the results of multidimensional scaling, he conjectures that
the internal space that people recover represents these parame-
ters. This implies that nearby points in the original parameter
space are near in the mental space, and it is short step from this to
saying that similarity is preserved between the two spaces. Such
results are not surprising where the dimensions of variation in the
objects are subjectively obvious (e.g., the length and orientation
of line segments), and in such cases this correlation between pa-
rameter space and mental space is frequently found. But it is im-
pressive with Edelman’s stimuli, where the underlying dimensions
of variation are far from obvious and interact in a complex way to
produce the visual image.
Edelman moves from these results to a general theory of per-
ception founded on similarity. He presents this as an alternative to
a “reconstructionist” approach. The goal of perception is assumed
to be preserving similarities between things in the environment,
rather than building an internal representation of environmental
structure. Edelman’s target article is important and should act as
a valuable stimulus for future research. We believe, however, that
there are three difficulties with this viewpoint as a general pro-
gram in perception.
(1) The notion of “distal” similarity seems ill-defined. Goodman
(1972) pointed out that any two objects have infinitely many com-
mon and distinctive features, thus “objectively” everything is
equally similar to everything else. Watanabe (1985b) illustrates
that even choosing for a set of objects only those predicates that
are extensionally distinct (which for a finite set of objects is a fi-
nite set of predicates) still leaves all between-object similarities
equal, unless differential weights for predicates are introduced.
This is not just a philosophical nicety. In Edelman’s experiments,
stimuli are generated artificially by varying a set of parameters;
thus nearness in parameter space may be chosen as a reasonable
measure of similarity.
But the natural world has not been generated by manipulating
a small number of underlying parameters. Variation in natural ob-
jects can be considered along a limitless number of dimensions.
By choosing (and assigning differential weights to) any subset of
these dimensions, all manner of “distal” similarities can be gener-
ated. Objects may be compared by overall color, by outline shape
using any number of shape representation systems, by nearness to
the observer (or to Pluto!), by weight, by perimeter length, and so
on, indefinitely. Moreover, any of these measurements can be
combined in arbitrary ways (e.g., perimeter length times weight)
to produce new measures that can be used to give new dimen-
sions.
Any set of any dimensions seems equally good as a distal mea-
sure of similarity. It might be suggested, for example, that physics
could supply constraints on what can count as an underlying di-
mension, but it should be clear that this still leaves an infinite
number of possible dimensions along which objects in the envi-
ronment might be assessed; moreover, it will rule out many psy-
chologically critical dimensions (e.g., the dimensions that define
facial structure) since these do not relate to physical quantities. In
short, it does not make sense to say that two things are similar
without specifying in what way they are similar (Goodman 1972);
to specify this, however, requires a cognitive agent to define which
dimensions of distal variation matter and which do not; then the
relation between an “objective” distal similarity structure and the
similarity structure in the internal space of an agent breaks down.
This means the claim that the perceptual system preserves an ob-
jective distal similarity structure loses its sense. Edelman, rather
than dealing with objective properties of the world, is dealing with
two different descriptions or representations – an experimenter-
intended one (the underlying parametrization) and one formed by
participants (the internal similarity spaces).
The situation seems analogous to the general philosophical dif-
ficulty with the correspondence theory of truth: there is no “mind-
independent” way to specify which facts the world consists of, so
the claim that true statements correspond to these facts is circu-
lar. In exactly the same way, there is no “mind-independent” way
to specify which are the similarities in the world, so the claim that
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similarities in mental space correspond to these external similar-
ities is circular. But if there are no distal similarities, there can be
no second-order isomorphism on which to build a theory of rep-
resentation. The debate about the correspondence theory of
truth as stated by us is a philosophical classic. The point we are
making – that there is no “picture” relationship between state-
ments and world – is widely accepted (see Strawson, Ayer,
Wittgenstein II) even within logical positivism (for example,
Neurath).
(2) Perception frequently appears to involve classifying very 
different patterns as similar. For example, the sequences
101010101010 and 010101010101 appear similar, even though
they differ at each spatial location. Similarly, a photograph and its
negative will be judged similar, even though they differ in every
pixel value. Or again, different pictures of the same face, or dif-
ferent tokens of the same phoneme, will seem very similar, even
if, under some obvious physical description, they appear com-
pletely different. The point is that the perceptual system identi-
fies the common structure in both stimuli. How does this relate to
Edelman’s claim that distal structure is preserved in the internal
representation of similarity? Using some obvious physical inter-
pretation of the stimulus, the objects are very different, yet they
are judged to be very similar, violating Edelman’s theory. But us-
ing, instead, a perceptually appropriate description for measuring
“distal” similarity (e.g., that the stimuli above are both examples
of alternating patterns: descriptions in terms of the structure of a
face or the identity of a phoneme), the similarities between the
distal world and the mind are preserved, but only at the cost of cir-
cularity.
(3) Finally, we suggest that the reconstructive approach to per-
ception may not be an alternative to Edelman’s similarity-based
view of perception. Instead, a reconstruction of the perceptual
world may be required to explain why the similarities are judged
as they are. For example, with Edelman’s artificial figures, the pa-
rameters of variations may be of interest as part of a specification
of the structure of those figures – indeed, only by attempting to
reconstruct those figures does it seem possible to realize that there
are only a small number of underlying parameters of variation
(i.e., the recipe for reconstructing each figure is the same, apart
from parametric variation). Thus, the parametrization used as a
basis for internal similarity judgments may be based on the at-
tempt to reconstruct the figure. For example, it is not clear why
two pictures of the same face will be judged to be similar unless
the same underlying 2/3D structure has been reconstructed (at
least partially) for both. Thus, we would argue that the recon-
structionist view of perception may be an important component
in an account of similarity of relevance to Edelman’s empirical re-
sults.
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